ABSTRACT: Besley and Rosen (1998) were the first authors to empirically estimate the presence of vertical tax externalities. They tested it on gasoline and tobacco unitary taxes. However, they did not take into account the difference in cost of living across states: high cost areas pay less in real terms than low cost areas, since the nominal unit tax on cigarettes and gasoline does not differ according to the state in which it is applied. Consequently, we propose that vertical tax competition can be estimated by deflating all financial variables using the House Price Index (HPI), which is disaggregated by states. This produces a federal tax variable that is expressed in real terms and shows cross-sectional variation. This empirical strategy enabled us to disentangle the vertical interdependence between state and federal tax rates from aggregate shocks over time, using US data from 1975 to 2006 on gasoline and tobacco. We found significant horizontal tax competition, which was higher for cigarettes, but no vertical tax reaction. The results were robust to the period analyzed.
Introduction
The co-occupation of the same tax bases between layers of government might make taxes inefficiently high from a social perspective, if taxes are distortionary (Keen, 1998) . Co-occupation creates a common pool problem. Each sub-central government sets taxes without taking into account the erosion of federal revenues, and so underestimates the reduction in the level of federal public good provision in its own jurisdiction.
In the literature, the presence of vertical tax externalities has been tested by estimating the reaction of sub-central government to variations in the federal tax rate. This is an indirect test of vertical externality. It implies that the interdependence one might find between the state and the federal tax is due to the strategic behavior of the state, which reacts to the negative fiscal externality that it is bearing due to a federal tax decision that erodes state-tax revenues. 1 The empirical results in the literature are somewhat mixed:
sub-central governments react by increasing or decreasing tax rates, which is coherent, to a certain extent, with the ambiguous results obtained in the theoretical literature (Keen, 1998; Devereux et al., 2007) . Besley and Rosen (1998) were the first authors to attempt to test for the presence of vertical tax externalities in unitary taxes. They tested cigarettes and gasoline and obtained a positive reaction in both cases (that was greater for gasoline). Regarding cigarettes, Devereux et al. (2007) used a different time period, and in some cases estimated different equations (e.g., the lagged endogenous variable and/or taking into consideration horizontal tax competition), but did not find a statistically significant response, while Fredriksson and Mamun (2008) found a negative response. The results for gasoline are not so contradictory: Devereux et al. (2007) found a positive or no reaction. In this paper, we will reconsider these estimations, and will thus try to reconcile the somewhat contradictory results, which were all obtained for the US case.
In all the studies cited above, the federal unitary tax rate did not show cross-sectional variation, as it was transformed into real terms by a national consumer price index (CPI). The deflation of a federal tax with a national deflator can give a misleading idea of the real tax burden imposed at state level: cost differentials impact the value of a federal dollar differently among states. In a federal country like the USA, economic and quality-of-life conditions may vary widely according to the area considered. Recent discussions in the USA have focused on the fact that high cost areas pay more in real terms of income tax for the transfers and federal public goods and services they receive. This is because federal income tax is based on nominal income, but its real value varies among geographical areas due to differences in the cost of living. In contrast, federal transfers and public goods and services are normally indexed using the federal CPI, rather than a state cost of living. This asymmetry has generated political attention, as well as recent academic interest (Albouy, 2008; Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai, 2006; Shapiro, 2006; Glaeser, 1998) .
Differences in prices among states can be explained by the general equilibrium trade theory (Rosen, 1979; Roback 1982 Roback , 1988 : the difference in quality of life and in labor productivity generates labor migration, and therefore creates gaps in price levels across states. Some authors argue that federal taxation should take into account this peculiarity through indexation to the cost of living, which is disaggregated by states (Albouy, 2008) . US congressmen from high cost areas have also repeatedly supported proposals to index taxes and transfers to regional cost of living (the Tax Equity Act; the Poverty Data Correction Act; the COLA Fairness Act), but none of these acts have been passed.
Similar legislation is proposed every Congress. The most recent proposal was the Tax Equity Act of 2005.
Almost all of the political and academic debate has focused on the unfairness of not indexing the federal income tax. However, a similar problem could arise with a federal unit tax, such as that on gasoline or cigarettes. In this case, given that the nominal unit tax on cigarettes and gasoline does not differ among states, high cost areas pay less in real terms than low cost areas. Consequently, this bias should be internalized (i.e., an absence of regional cost of living indexation for federal taxation) in the different states' expenditure and tax decisions. Namely, states should set their taxes and level of expenditure by evaluating the corresponding financial determinants (e.g., the federal tax rate), according to the local cost of living. A national deflator might also be used to obtain real federal taxes. However, this creates a potential identification problem between the variation in the federal tax rate and common shocks. This econometric problem was recognized in previous studies of vertical tax competition applied to unitary taxes (Devereux et al., 2007) . In particular, the impossibility of including time effects potentially creates a specification bias, as the estimate of the federal variable might pick up the impact of aggregate shocks. This problem disappears if we use the HPI deflator-a price index that shows cross-sectional variation-as it allows for the inclusion of time effects to control for shocks.
When we used the HPI, we did not find any vertical response for cigarette taxation or gasoline taxation. As shown in Section 2, some of the results of studies that used the CPI deflator are dependent on the time period considered. In contrast, once we had controlled for common annual shocks, our results did not depend on the time period considered. Regarding horizontal tax competition, we found a strong reaction for cigarette and gasoline taxes. In particular, in the long term, a 1 cent increase in the neighboring states' tax rates provokes a 0.57 cent increase in the corresponding state's tax rate for gasoline. This reaction was even stronger for cigarettes (a 0.87 cent increase). According to Proposition 1 in Devereux et al. (2007) , if demand is priceinelastic, we should expect no vertical reaction and a horizontal reaction of 0.5. Our empirical results were consistent with this proposition, as there was no vertical response. However, the estimate of 0.5 for horizontal tax competition only applied to gasoline. In the case of cigarettes, the well-documented presence of interstate crossborder shopping and smuggling (Fleenor, 1998; or Farrelly et al., 2003) and the fact that this good is easily storable, which implies scale economies in shopping (Scharf, 1999) , might make the horizontal reaction stronger. 4 This positive reaction was also obtained by Rork (2003) .
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the results obtained in the previous literature, which all apply to unitary taxes and to the USA; in Section 3 we develop our empirical framework and present the data, and in Section 4 we present our results. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 5. This instability of the estimated sign of the state reaction over time might be due to the impact of annual common shocks, which are not properly controlled for in the aforementioned studies. This was explicitly recognized by Devereux et al. (2007) , in which they stated that "the presence of federal variables, which vary only over time, preclude the use of time dummies which might otherwise capture aggregate shocks which create a common effect across states on cigarette tax rates" (p. 466). This creates a potential identification problem, in the sense that the key variable in the empirical specification (the federal tax rate) might be confused with a linear combination of year common shocks. In Section 3, we will explain how we try to overcome this identification problem. With respect to gasoline, the results obtained in the literature are not as contradictory, but indicate a positive or no reaction. Table 2 shows these results. Again, Besley and Rosen (1998) obtained a positive reaction (row 1, Table 2 ), which was not robust (row 2) to expanding the period to 1997 (Devereux et al., 2007) . Therefore, the time span was again of key importance. This result does not change if we take into account the horizontal tax competition and inertia of taxes (row 3 and 4) (Devereux et al., 2007) .
Previous literature
Given the ambiguous results obtained in the literature for the same taxes and country, a more robust empirical approach is clearly needed to tackle the identification problem, which is namely to disentangle the impact of aggregate shocks on the state tax rate from variations in the federal tax rate. ε is a mean zero, normally distributed random error.
As long as the estimate of γ is different from zero, we can confirm the relevance of a vertical tax externality.
In order to isolate the independent impact of the federal tax rate on the tax rate of the states, we include other variables that might affect the state tax rate and that must be taken into account. These variables are included in the vector jst X . In particular, state taxation may be influenced by the economic and demographic environment. As usual in the literature, this is controlled for by the following variables: population (and its square), per-capita income (and its square), unemployment rate, proportion of population over 65 and proportion of population between 5 and 17. We also take federal fiscal instruments into account, as these may differ from state to state and might condition the setting of state tax rates. Thus, we include federal grants-in-aid in relation to total population and the federal income tax collected in each state, normalized by the adjusted gross income. As we work with real tax rates and nominal tax rates change infrequently, we control for inflation. The political affiliation of the state government may also affect the tax-rate level. Thus, we divide the US party system into two main groups: Republicans and Democrats. We also build dummies for the governors' membership in each of the two political groups and variables to account for the percentage in the House and Senate of the two groups.
Certain unchanging characteristics of a state are likely to affect its tax system, such as climate or geography, among others. We can take these characteristics into account by including a dichotomous variable for each state. Changes in the macroeconomic situation may also affect states' fiscal policies. To account for this, we include a set of time dummies, unlike previous studies on vertical tax externalities. This is of key importance to our paper. As we explain in Section 3.2.2, this is possible as we use a state price index to deflate our federal unitary tax. This ensures that the federal tax rate has time and cross-sectional variation. Thus, time effects can be included in Equation
[1]. To date, common shocks in the literature have been controlled by the inclusion of federal GDP and federal unemployment, which are only a specific two-linear combination of common annual shocks.
2. Data

Nominal tax rates
We use annual data on US states from 1975 . From 1975 to 1983 , the federal gasoline tax was four cents per gallon. In 1983, the gasoline tax increased to 9 cents, of which 8 financed the Highway Trust Fund and 1 funded the Mass Transit Fund. From 1987, the rate increased by 0.1 to finance the Underground Storage Tank Leakage Fund.
On 1 December 1990, the tax rate jumped to 14.1, which generated an increase in resources for Transportation grants, but also for the specific purpose "deficit reduction".
On 1 October 1993, there was a further increase to 18.4, which was only due to an increase in the provision of resources to reduce the deficit. This is because it precludes the real federal tax rate from showing cross sectional variation, which prevents us from controlling for macroeconomic shocks by using year effects. The federal tax could be a particular linear combination of year effects.
However, it is reasonable to consider that prices vary widely across US states and have a real impact on federal taxes (see, for example, Albouy, 2008) . The increase in the federal nominal gasoline tax in 1990 from 9 cents to 14.1 cents did not have the same impact in Wyoming as in California. It had a more negative effect on the former than the latter, as the price level is higher in California than in Wyoming. Thus, if we use the same deflator in both states, the impact of the federal tax rate on the tax decision of California may be overestimated with respect to Wyoming.
To resolve this problem, we use the HPI to deflate financial variables. Shapiro (2006) showed that house price differentials among states are the prime determinant of cost-ofliving differences. He found that a 10% increase in the implicit price of land increases the price of the market basket of goods and services used to compute the CPI by about 3.2%, with a lower bound of 2.2%. Moreover, Albouy (2008) variables that determine state-tax choices. However, in some states, the HPI increases on average much more than the CPI, particularly after the 1990s. Most of these are coastal states (Figure 1) . Hence, some caution should be taken in interpreting our results, since the volatility of house prices is significantly different in the coastal states (Figure 2 ) from the rest of the US states (Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Davis and Palumbo, 2006; Glaeser et al., 2008) . In our empirical analysis, we perform a robustness check to test the sensitivity of our results to the exceptional performance of house prices in coastal states.
[FIGURE 1]
The other variables
The rest of the right-hand-side variables of [1], with their definitions, meanings and standard deviations are also reported in Table 3 . In the following sections, we use data that is both normalized by the CPI and by the HPI. In the former case, as previously shown in the empirical literature, we control for macroeconomic shocks using the national unemployment rate, FEDUNEMP, and the real federal GDP. In contrast, when we use the HPI we include year effects.
[ (Dixit, 1996) . Therefore, we use a measure of importance to the state economy, as in Besley and Rosen (1998) Finally, we account for state unchanging characteristics by using state fixed effects.
Empirical strategy
The mean US neighboring tax rate, ∑ With respect to the federal tax rate, we could also consider that the federal layer and state governments set their tax rates simultaneously, which is the case in Devereux et al. (2007) . In contrast, Besley and Rosen (1998) assume that the federal government is a Stackelberg leader and therefore the federal tax rate is exogenous. We take a conservative approach and instrument the federal tax rate by using the federal deficit over the federal GDP, as Besley and Rosen (1998) 
Results
We started by using the dataset that had been deflated with CPI. The results are shown in Table 4 . In column (1), we obtained a positive reaction of states to federal tax increases. A $1 increase in the federal gasoline tax provoked a $0.37 increase in the state tax rate (5% statistically significant). However, this basic result might be biased, as we did not control for horizontal tax competition or for the possibility of inertia in the setting of state tax rates. Once we had included spatial lag in the basic model, in column (2) the reaction due to the vertical tax externality was no longer significant, while a strong horizontal reaction emerged (0.95; 1% significant). Finally, in column (3), we simultaneously took into account both factors (horizontal tax competition and inertia).
In this case, vertical tax externality was still not an issue, while the horizontal tax reaction strongly diminished (0.24; 1% significant), but was still significant. We obtained significant inertia (today's taxes are almost 80% of yesterday's taxes). The presence of inertia enabled us to differentiate between a short-term reaction in terms of horizontal tax competition (0.24), and a long-term reaction (0.24/(1-0.78)=1.09; which we cannot reject as equal to 1).
[TABLE 4] Nonetheless, the above results might be conditioned by the impossibility of fully controlling for macroeconomic shocks. As we argued before, the use of a state price index enabled us to enrich the previous empirical specification and include a set of time effects. This is shown in columns (4) to (6) of Table 4 . The previous results were basically unchanged. That is, there was no vertical reaction (either in the short-term or the long-term), there was a significant degree of inertia (0.79 in column 6; 1% significant), and we still detected horizontal interaction, although to a lesser extent (0.12 in column 6; 1% significant). In this case, the long-term reaction due to horizontal tax competition was 0.57 (1% significant).
If we compare the statistical tests of column (3) and column (6), we can see that the model that includes time effects has greater explanatory power and the test of overidentifying restrictions performs better. In addition, the long-term reaction for horizontal competition seems more reasonable (i.e., the long-term estimate is below 1) when we use the HPI. In fact, if we use the HPI, the results obtained are fully consistent with Proposition 1 of Devereux et al. (2007) : if demand is price-inelastic, the theoretical prediction is that there should be no vertical reaction and the reaction due to horizontal tax competition should be 0.5, which coincides with our long-term estimate (we cannot reject at 1% that the estimate is equal to 0.5). Finally, in both sets of regressions, the estimate of inflation was negative. That is, regardless of how inflation was measured (national vs. state), states seemed to be reluctant to vary their nominal tax rates in the presence of inflation, which is coherent with casual observation and with previous literature (Bowmann and Mikesell, 1983; Ang-Olson et al., 1999) .
In Table 5 , we present the same set of results, but for cigarette taxation. The main difference can be seen in the horizontal tax competition, which is stronger in this case.
This result is qualitatively coherent with that of Devereux et al. (2007) . When we used the CPI, we obtained a short-term reaction equal to 0.35 (1% significant) and a longterm reaction equal to 1.54 (1% significant) (column 3). When we used the HPI, we obtained 0.22 (1% significant) and 0.87 (1% significant) (column 6), respectively.
Moreover, when inflation was measured by the CPI, it did not have a significant effect on state taxes, that is, the states maintained the level of real tax rates, according to the inflation index. However, this result might be misleading, as the CPI-based inflation rate does not show cross-sectional variation, and so might mimic other uncontrolled factors that also only show time variation. In contrast, an increase in the state price index decreases the level of real state taxes, which means that states do not take into account variations in the HPI when they set their tax rates, or that states are generally reluctant to update their statutory tax rates according to the inflation rate.
Overall, for the period 1975-2006, the main difference between using the CPI and the HPI is that the latter index gives a lower estimate of horizontal tax competition. Most importantly, its long-term value is below one, which guarantees the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in the tax-setting.
[ In the literature review of Section 2, we showed that the time period was of key importance for the empirical results, in terms of the vertical tax reaction. We will now check whether this is also the case for our empirical approach. To test this approach, in Table 6 we compared our results with those obtained by Frediksson and Mamun (2008) .
As we already know from Section 2, these authors obtained a negative reaction for cigarette taxation in terms of vertical externality, once they had restricted the period to 1983 onwards. In other words, they excluded the late 1970s, in which neither the state nor the federal government carried out statutory tax changes. In Table 6 , we have replicated the regressions for the period 1983-01, with the only difference that we included the inflation rate and the lagged endogenous variable. We obtained the same result: a $1 increase in the federal cigarette tax provoked a $0.48 (5% significant) decrease in state taxes. This result was replicated when the inflation rate and the lagged endogenous variable were excluded. However, we did not find this result when we included a set of time effects. In this case, just as for the whole period, states did not react to federal taxes. In Table 6 , we also estimated a tax reaction function for gasoline.
The estimate of the vertical tax externality using CPI was also negative (-0.22, 10% significant) and positive but statistically insignificant when we used the HPI. Therefore, the negative reaction obtained by Frediksson and Mamun (2008) is not exclusive to cigarette taxation, but disappears when we control for aggregate shocks.
[ (Glaeser et al., 2008) . This peculiar price behavior in the housing market might make the HPI less reliable as a proxy of a general state price index.
Therefore, in Table 7 we performed a robustness check to test whether our results are dependent on that expansionary path of house prices. In columns (1) and (2) we show the results excluding the coastal states for gasoline and cigarettes, respectively; while in columns (3) and (4) we show results excluding the years from 1996 onwards, again for gasoline and cigarettes, respectively. There were no changes in terms of vertical tax externality: state tax rates did not respond to changes in the federal tax rate for gasoline or for cigarettes. With respect to horizontal tax competition, we still found this to be an issue in the US tax setting.
[ TABLE 7 ]
Conclusions
We tested the impact of an increase in federal tax on state tax in the USA, and provide evidence that an increase in the federal tax does not affect state tax rates in the case of gasoline and cigarettes. Our results differ from those of previous papers, in which mixed results were obtained.
The novelty of our empirical approach is that we can identify the impact of the federal tax rate on the state tax rate by using a state-specific deflator, the HPI, which differs from the usual CPI as it presents cross-sectional variations. This approach allows us to test the impact of the federal tax rate on the state tax rate by controlling for macroeconomic shocks, proxied by year effects. This is not possible when the CPI is used as a deflator, in which the real federal tax rate is perfectly collinear with a particular linear combination of year effects. We developed a test using a data set for the USA running from 1975 to 2006 for cigarette and gasoline taxes.
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Data Appendix
• t st US cigarette tax rate for state s in year t, divided by the CPI or the HPI. These rates are taken from www.OTPR.org: cigarette tax rates are expressed in US dollars per pack of 20 cigarettes and gasoline tax rates are expressed in US dollars per gallon of gasoline.
Endogenous variables
• T t is the federal US cigarette tax rate. This data is taken from www.OTPR.org.
• ∑ ≠ s i st si t w is the mean of the states tax rates, divided by the CPI or HPI, of the states bordering state s in year t.
Demographic and economic variables
• POP st is the number of persons in state s in year t. This figure is taken from www.census.gov.
• CHILD st is the ratio of individuals aged 5-17 years to the total population of state s in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA.
• AGED st is the ratio of individuals of over 65 years of age to the total population of state s in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA.
• UNEMP st is the unemployment rate for state s in year t, taken from www.stats.bls.gov.
• INC st is the per-capita income for state s in year t divided by the CPI or HPI.
Income data were taken from http://www.bea.doc.gov.
• GRANT st is the per-capita federal grant-in-aid for state s in year t. It is obtained from "Federal Expenditures by State" which is part of the Consolidated Federal Funds Reports program from US Census Bureau.
• DEMGOV st dummy=1 if the governor of the state is a Democratic, taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States.
• DEMSEN st proportion of state Senate that is Democratic, taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States.
• DEMHOU st proportion of state House that is Democratic, taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States.
• GDP t is the federal GDP for year t divided by the CPI or HPI, taken the Statistical Abstracts of the United States.
• FED UNEMP t is the federal unemployment for year t, taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States.
• CPI t (Consumer Price Index) was taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States (2000).
• HPI st (House Price Index) was taken from http://www.ofheo.gov, the website of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight in the USA.
• TOBINC st annual tobacco production (thousand of pounds); from http://www.nass.usda.gov, the website of the National Agricultural Statistics Service in the USA.
• GASINC st is the daily gasoline production (thousand barrels per day) per dollar of state income in real terms with CPI or HPI; from http://www.eia.doe.gov, the website of the Energy Information Administration in the USA.
• INCTAX st federal income tax divided by adjusted gross income. Federal income tax and adjusted gross income are from the http://www.irs.gov, the website of the Internal Revenue Service, a Department of the Treasury in the USA. in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Two stage least squares regressions where the average of the taxes of the neighbors (Wstgastax) are instrumented by using the average of the neighbors of AGED, CHILD, STUNEMP, DEMSEN, DEMHOU while in columns 1-3 FEDGASTAX are also instrumented by means of FED DEF. We use the Hansen-Sargan test to test for overidentifying restrictions. The J-statistic is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity; Sargan's statistic is not. Since we use the command "robust" and therefore assume the presence of heteroskedasticity, which is quite common in a panel for a federal nation such as US, we use, as STATA does, Hansen's Jstatistic, which allows observations to be correlated within groups. 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
